It is argued that without collateral the poor often face binding borrowing constraints in the formal credit market. This justifies a micro-credit program, which is operated by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies to provide the poor with preferential credit. This paper examines poverty targeting and impact of the micro-credit program. It is found that the program is not very pro-poor in terms of targeting. Among the participants, the non-poor account for a larger proportion. The non-poor also tend to receive larger amounts of credit compared to the poor. However, the program has positive impact on poverty reduction of the participants. This positive impact is found for all the three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures. The results suggest that the program can be expanded taking into account reducing the leakage rate.
Introduction
Although Vietnam has experienced remarkable reduction in poverty over the past 10 years, nearly 20% of the population still lives below the poverty line (Table 1) . It is often argued that micro-credit is an important tool for smoothing consumption and promoting production, especially for poor households (e.g. Zeller, et al. 1997; Conning and Udry, 2005) . However, without collateral the poor can face binding constraints in the credit market. Thus, the Vietnamese government has set up the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) to provide the poor with preferential micro-credit since 2003.
The role of micro-credit in improving household welfare is found in many empirical studies. Micro-credit programs that are assessed are implemented in several developing countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, etc. For example, Pitt and Khandker (1998) measure impact of group-based lending programs in Bangladesh, and find that the programs have positive and statistically significant impact on household consumption. In another paper, Khander (2003) finds that micro-finance brings benefits for the poorest, thereby reducing significantly poverty in Bangladesh. Significant impacts of credit on expenditure increases for farmers in Pakistan are also found in Khander and Faruqee (2003) . Burgess and Pande (2002) examine the expansion of bank branches on household welfare, and show that this expansion decreases poverty and inequality. Zaman (2001) finds positive impact of micro-credit provided by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee in Bangladesh on poverty and vulnerability reduction. Other successful stories of micro-credit in reducing poverty can be found in a review paper of Morduch and Haley (2002) .
However, there are several studies that do not find significant impact of micro-credit on welfare improvement and poverty reduction. For example, Diagne and Zeller (2001) do not find statistically significant impact of micro-credit on household income in Malawi. Morduch (1998) shows that most of potential impacts of micro-credit from the Grameen bank in Bangladesh are on vulnerability reduction instead of poverty reduction. Coleman (1999) finds only negligible impact of a micro-credit program in Thailand on household welfare.
In Vietnam, questions on poverty targeting and impact of the VBSP program remain unanswered so far. Most of evaluation reports simply describe the implementation and outputs of the program such as how many people received credit from the program or how much capital was put into the program. The Government has spent a huge amount of finance in the VBSP program. According to VBSP (2005) , the total outstanding loans for poor households were 8249 billion VND 3 in 2004. Information on the quantitative assessment of a program can be of interest for several reasons. Firstly, it is very helpful in determining whether the program should be expanded, terminated, or revised. A program with bad targeting and negligible impact should be considered for termination or modification. Secondly, the assessment can provide useful information for improving the program. For example, if it is found that only a small proportion of the poor receive credit from the program in urban areas, then the program selection should be changed to increase the effectiveness of targeting in those areas. The main objective of this paper is to examine how well the VBSP program reaches the poor, and to which extent the program has an impact on household welfare and poverty reduction. To measure impact, the paper employs two methods including the instrumental variables regression and the fixed-effect panel data with instrumental variables. Data used in the analysis are from Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys that were conducted in 2002 and 2004.
The paper is structured in 5 sections. The second section introduces the data sources and examines the poverty targeting of the VBSP program. The third section presents the methodology of impact evaluation. Next, empirical findings on program impact are presented in the fourth section. Finally the fifth section concludes.
Poverty Targeting of the VBSP Program

Data Sources
The study relies on data from the two VHLSSs, which were conducted by GSO with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years and 2004 and 2004 VHLSSs covered 30000 and 9000 households, respectively. 4 The selection of the samples follows a method of stratified random cluster sampling so that the households are representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. It is very interesting that the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs set up a panel of 4000 households, which are representative for the whole country, and regions of large population.
The surveys collected information through household and community level questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment and labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, and especially information on loans that households had obtained or still owned during the 12 months before the interview. Data on expenditure and income were collected using very detailed questionnaires. Information on small and detailed expenditure and income categories was collected and then aggregated into expenditure and income per capita.
Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2960 and 2181 communes in the 2002 and 2004 surveys, respectively. Data on commune characteristics consists of demography and general situation of communes, general economic conditions and aid programs, non-farm employment, agriculture production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and social affairs. Commune data can be linked with household data to assess relationship between characteristics of households and characteristics of communes in which the households are located. It is a pity that the commune data in the 2004 VHLSS are only available for rural areas.
Description of the VBSP Program
The poor often face shortages of capital and assets. Without collateral they find it more difficult in accessing credit in formal markets. Table 1 compares income, expenditure and main assets between the poor and non-poor in Vietnam. It shows that the poor have lower income and expenditure per capita than the non-poor. The domestic and foreign remittances are also very limited for the poor. They also tend to have lower value of fixed and durable assets compared to the non-poor. The government of Vietnam has been aware of this fact, and has conducted policies to provide the poor with preferential micro-credit. Between 1995 and 2002, the Bank for the Poor was established under the control of the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (BARD) with the purpose to provide poor households with favorable credit. Since the beginning of 2003, the Government has launched a new bank called Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which is independent of BARD. The poor can borrow credit from VBSP at low interest rates without collateral. Now the branches of VBSP are established in all the districts of Vietnam. The VBSP program is designed as a group-based lending scheme. In order to borrow credit from VBSP, a household should join a credit group in their locality. A credit group should include from 5 to 50 members located in the same village. If the number of members in a village is lower than 5, they should join a group in another village. Each credit group sets up a management board, which is responsible for borrowing and credit use of its members.
There are several criteria that a household should meet to become a member of a credit group:
-The household has a long-term residence permit at the locality in which the credit group is located.
-The household has someone who is able to work (working force).
-The household is classified as the poor by local authority.
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-The household has a demand for credit. The credit needs to be used in production, or consumption necessary for subsistence. 6 Total loan size is not more than 7 millions VND.
A household can borrow many times, but the total outstanding loans cannot be large than this number.
Once being a member of a credit group, a household can apply for loans of the VBSP. Firstly, they send a formatted letter to their credit group. In the letter the household specifies the amount and purpose of the loan that they intend to take. When receiving the application, the credit group will arrange a meeting of all members to consider the relevance of the loan. The credit group determines which household is able to borrow, and amount and terms of each loan. A list of applicants will be prepared by the credit group and sent to the People's Committee in that commune. Once the list is ratified by the People's Committee, it will be sent to a VBSP branch for final approval. The time of the borrowing process is rather short. It often takes from one to four weeks to obtain credit since households send the borrowing request to their credit groups.
It is shown that the process of lending and monitoring credit of VBSP is rather stringent, which is expected to ensure high repayment rates. According to VBSP (2005) , the ratio of overdue outstanding loans to the total outstanding loans is about 2.96% in 2005. Among the overdue loans, amount of loans that borrowers cannot return accounts for 59.9%. It is obvious that the credit group and the People's Committee have a very important role in determining who get credit from the VBSP. They are also highly responsible for the repayment of credit group members. Thus, the credit group and commune heads tend to exclude very poor households who might not be able to repay loans (Dufhues, et al. 2002) . On the other hand, non-poor or even better-off households can get loans from VBSP, since they are expected to have higher capacity to repay the loans.
Poverty Targeting of the VBSP Program
In this study, a household is classified as poor if their per capita expenditure is below the poverty line which is set up by WB and GSO. The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allow for nutritional needs and some essential non-food consumption such as clothing and housing. This poverty line was first estimated in 1993. Poverty lines in the following years are estimated by deflating the 1993 poverty line using the consumer price index.
7 Figure 1 presents the poverty rates over the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . 
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Source: Estimation of VHLSS in 1993 , and 2004 It shows that the proportion of people with per capita expenditure under the poverty line dropped dramatically from 58.1% in 1993 to 37.4% in 1998. The poverty rate continued to decrease to 28. 9% and 19.5% in 2002 and 2004, respectively. 8 However the poverty rate remains rather high in rural areas, at 25% in 2004. In this paper, we focus on the rural population. The main reason is that we will use several commune variables in regression analysis of the VBSP impact, and there are only data on commune information for rural areas in the 2004 VHLSS. The main targeting of the VBSP is rural areas, since around 95% of the poor are located in rural areas. As a result, about 87% of the VBSP participants in 2004 were rural people.
The poverty targeting of the VBSP program is examined in Table 2 . The left panel of this table investigates how well the program reaches households who are defined as poor by the WB-GSO poverty line, while the right panel examines how the program targets households who are classified as poor by commune authorities. As regulated by the program, only households who are classified as poor by commune authorities are eligible for the credit borrowing.
The left panel of Table 2 shows that only 12% of the poor households in rural areas borrowed credit from the VBSP in 2004. It means that the coverage rate of the program was low: nearly 88% of poor households did not use the favorable credit. The coverage rate for the nonpoor was 6.9%, respectively. The poor tended to receive smaller amounts of credit than the middle and the rich. The loan size per a poor participating household was VND 3174.6 7 Regional price differences and monthly price changes over the survey period have been taken into account when the poverty lines are calculated. 8 The poor are classified based on the expenditure poverty line constructed by WB-GSO. The poverty lines in the years 1993 , and 2004 are equal to 1160 , 1790 , 1917 , and 2077 thousands, which was rather lower than the amount of VND 3714.8 thousands that a non-poor household borrowed on average. In addition, the VBSP program had very high leakage rates. Among the borrowing households, poor households accounted for only 29.5%. In other words, a large proportion of borrowing households were non-poor.
When the poor classification by commune authorities is used, the coverage of the program is a bit higher, at 17.9%. This is because the ratio of poor households classified by communes is lower than the ratio of poor households classified by the WB-GSO poverty line. However, the leakage rate is also higher than when the poor is classified by the WB-GSO poverty line. 75.9% of the program participants were found non-poor households. Using poverty status of households after the program implementation can result in misleading analysis of the program targeting. Households who have received credit can increase their income and expenditure and get rid of poverty. Thus, Table 3 analyses the program targeting using poverty status in 2002, i.e., before the program. The estimates of the coverage rates of the program do not differ significantly from those in Table 2 . However, the leakage rates are smaller. When the poor was classified using the WB-GSO poverty line, they accounted for 45.5% of the program participants. There can at least two reasons why the VBSP program did not reach the poor households well. The first is the difference in poverty definition between the WB-GSO approach and local commune authorities. In a commune, a household is classified as poor if their income is below the income poverty line constructed by MOLISA and they meet several criteria such as lacking food or living in damaged house. These criteria are set up by each commune, and they can be very different from one commune to another. As a result, the poverty classification of commune authorities is not consistent across communes and over time. Table 4 compares poverty classification approaches between commune authorities and WB-GSO over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] . It shows that the commune approach covered 27.7% and 29.1% of households who were identified as poor by the WB-GSO approach in 2002 and 2004, respectively. In contrast, the poor by the WB-GSO approach accounted for 75.1% and 67.6% of the households who were classified as poor by commune authorities in 2002 and 2004, respectively. The second reason is mentioned in Dufhues, et al. (2002) . Credit groups and commune heads are reluctant to include poor households in the list of credit applicants. Non-poor can find it easier in borrowing credit, since they are expected to be more reliable in using credit effectively and repaying credit.
One important issue in examining the effectiveness of the credit is the usage of credit. Table 5 tabulates loan size by using purposes that were reported by respondents. A large proportion of credit was used in production and investment. The poor used about 62.5% of the VBSO credit amount for production capital and capital investment, while this proportion for the non-poor if and 58.9%. Credit was also used for dept repayment. However, the poor and nonpoor also used 29.2% and 33.7% of the credit amount for consumption, respectively. 
Methodology of Impact Evaluation
Parameters of interest
The main objective of impact evaluation of a program is to assess the extent to which the program has changed outcomes of subjects.
9 Suppose that there is a program assigned to some people in population P, and denote 
The most popular parameter of the program impact is Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Heckman, et al., 1999) , which is the expected impact of the program on the actual participants:
Since the size of loans taken by a household can be regarded a continuous variable, one can be interested in addition impact of program when the size of loans changes by an amount, denoted by δ . Denote 
When the amount of the program is
, the program impact is:
Thus we can measure the change in program impact due a change in the amount of credit from d to
Since we cannot estimate (5) for each person, we are interested in its average:
Expectation in (6) can be written for those who participate in the program:
We can divide the right-hand side of (7) by δ to obtain a parameter called the average treatment effect of additional credit amount on the treated:
This parameter measures how the average program impact on the treated changes due to a small change in the amount of credit. 
Impact evaluation methods
The main problem in measuring impact of a micro-credit is endogeneity of the program participation. The borrowing of credit can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of households such as motivation for higher income or abilities in business. Failure to control for unobservable factors affecting the program participation, the program impact estimation is no longer unbiased. Most of the studies on impact evaluation of micro-credit program are aware of the endogeneity problem of program participation. Since experimental designs are difficult to be implemented for micro-credit programs, quasi-experimental and non-experimental designs are often used in impact evaluation. Examples of evaluation of micro-credit based quasi-experiments are Coleman (1999) , and Pitt and Khandker (1998) . Popular methods in non-experimental designs include instrumental variables (Khander and Faruqee, 2003; Burgess and Pande, 2002) , sample selection (e.g., Zaman, 2001) , and models based on panel data (e.g., Khander, 2003; Nguyen and Westbrook, 2006) .
To measure impact of the program, we assume that the outcome of intereste is a linear function of the conditioning exogenous variables X, the program variable D which can be binary or continuous, and error term ε :
The program impact is measured by parameter γ . It should be noted that when we are interested in impact of the participation in the program regardless of the size of the program, we can use D as a binary variable. When we are interested in the impact of additional amount credit on the participant, D is the loan size which is a continuous variable.
In the case of credit programs, the main problem in getting the unbiased estimator of γ is the correlation between the variables D and ε in equation (9). For the VBSP program, there can be unobserved variables such as business and production skills of households and business environment that would affect both the outcomes and program participation. As a result, the problem of endogeneity can happen, and methods that do not deal with this problem can lead to biased estimates of the program impact.
In this study, we use two methods to estimate the program impact. 14 This first method is the instrumental variables (IV) regressions. This method requires at least one instrumental variable Z, which must be correlated with the D variable but not correlated with the error tem, ε , given the X variables. If instruments are found, all the coefficients in (9) can be identified and estimated consistently using different estimators such as parametric two-stage least squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).
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The second method is the fixed-effect with IV regression using panel data from VHLSS 2002-2004. Using fixed-effect transformation, we can remove unobserved variables that are timeinvariants. Then, the IV regressions are applied to solve the problem of correlation between the D variable and the remaining time-variant error terms.
Impact Measurement of the VBSP Program
Impact of the VBSP Program on Household's Expenditure and Income
In this section, we present empirical findings of measurement of the VBSP program impact. The first step is to select the outcome and conditioning variables. A household is expected to use credit in production or consumption. If the credit is used effectively, their income and consumption expenditure per capita will be increased. We measure impact of the program on consumption expenditure per capita and income per capita. One reason for using expenditure per capita as an outcome is that expenditure is a popular welfare indicator and though which we can measure impact of VBSP on poverty reduction.
Total expenditure per capita is collected using very detailed questionnaires in VHLSS. Total expenditure includes food and non-food expenditure. Food expenditure includes purchased food and foodstuff and self-produced products of households. Non-food expenditure comprises expenditure on education, healthcare expenditure, expenditure on houses and commodities, and expenditure on power, water supply and garbage.
Total income per capita is also collected carefully. Household income can come from any source. Total income includes income from agricultural and non-agricultural production, salary, wage, pension, scholarship, income from loan interest and house rental, remittance and subsidies. Income from agricultural production comprises crop income, livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from other agriculture-related activities.
VHLSS 2002 and 2004 collect very detailed information on characteristics of households, communes and villages. There can be a large number of explanatory variables in outcome equations. The household variables include demography, household assets, housing, education, employment and health statues. The commune and village variables include infrastructure and socioeconomic characteristics. The explanatory variables should not be affected by the program. It should be noted that data on communes and villages are collected only for rural areas. Table 6 presents summary statistics of explanatory variables in the 2004 VHLSS. Number of observations 549 5878
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004
The first method used to measure the program impact is instrumental variables. Data used for the instrumental variables estimation are from the 2004 VHLSS. The key identification issue is to find a valid instrument for the program participation, i.e. credit borrowing. Such an instrument should be correlated with the program participant and excluded from the outcome equation. In this study, we use two instrumental variables. The first one is the commune poverty rate which is based on the poverty classification of commune authorities. It is obvious that households' participation is correlated with criteria of program selection. One of the selection criteria is the poverty status classified by the commune authorities. A commune which has a large number of poor households will have a large number of potential participants in the program. However, when there are many applicants for the credit borrowing, credit groups and commune heads tend to screen the applicant list more carefully, since they also have responsibility in ensuring the repayment rate of the borrowers. More applicants can be excluded from the borrowing list. As a result, an eligible household who live in a commune with a large number of poor households will face higher competition in borrowing credit from the program.
The second instrumental variable is the distance from a village where households are located to the nearest bank. The 2004 VHLSS collected just information on the distance from a village to a branch bank. There is no information on whether the closest branch bank is a VBSP one. Although the nearest bank can be any commercial bank instead of a VBSP branch, the VBSP bank can be located close to the nearest bank. Households in a village which is closer to a VBSP branch bank can be more likely to obtain credit from the bank.
The condition of correlation between the instrumental variables and credit borrowing can be investigated by running a regression of borrowing on the instrumental variables and other explanatory variables. Table A .1 in Appendix reports results of selected regressions. The second and third columns show regressions of the program participation and size of VBSP loans. Variable "commune poverty rate" and "distance to the nearest bank" are statistically correlated with the participation of households in the VBSP program. As expected, both the instrumental variables are statistically significant and negatively correlated with the program participation. Living in an area with many eligible households or far from banks reduces the chance of program participation.
The condition of uncorrelation between the instrumental variables and the error term in outcome equations cannot be tested, since the error term is unobserved. In this study, there are at least two reasons for the absence of the commune poverty rate and distance to the nearest bank in the outcome equation. Firstly, commune and village variables that are most important in determining households' welfare are often infrastructures and geographic characteristics. Infrastructure variables can include road, market and school, etc. Geographic variables can be dummy regional variables, geographic types of locality, and distance to the nearest town, etc. Provided these variables are controlled for in the outcome equation, the instrumental variables would be uncorrelated with the unobserved variables in this outcome equation. Secondly, empirical findings show that commune and villages do not play important role in households' welfare once household variables are controlled for. Table A .1 in Appendix shows that few variables of villages and communes are statistically significant in outcome regressions.
To examine whether the impact estimates are sensitive to different instrumental variable estimators, the study uses three types of parametric estimators, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), and k-class estimators including limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). Impact estimates are presented in Table 7 . .785 (P-value=0.182 ).
Using LIML estimator: Hansen J statistic .457 (P-value=0.227 ). = 8.992 (P-value=0.003 ). = 9.680 (P-value=0.002 It should be noted that the results of impact evaluation using the instrumental variable method are estimated for rural areas only. In Table 7 only the estimates of coefficients of the program participation and the amount of borrowed credit from instrumental variables regression are presented. 16 The left panel of the table presents estimates from IV the regressions using The left panel shows that the estimates of the coefficient of the loan size are positive and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels for log of expenditure per capita and log of income per capita. The program participation also has positive and statistically significant coefficients. The estimates do not differ significantly across various IV estimators. The estimates from the fixed-effect with IV methods are also positive, but they are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, compared to the IV regressions, the estimates from the fixed-effect with IV ones have small standard errors.
Test of endogeneity of "Size of credit from the VBSP program":
- Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic ) 1 ( χ
Test of endogeneity of "Participation in the VBSP program":
When using the two instruments, we can perform overidentification test. Table 7 presents the Sargan-Hansen tests for estimators of 2SLS and LIML Based on this test statistic, we cannot reject the hypothesis on overidentification of instrumental variables. In addition, the endogeneity of program participation and loan size can be tested using the instruments. Results from DurbinWu-Hausman tests shows that the hypothesis on the exogeneity of the program participation and loan size from the program is strongly rejected.
Impact of the VBSP Program on Poverty
Since the VBSP program has positive impact on the consumption expenditure per capita, it is expected that the program can also affect the poverty reduction. In this paper, we measure poverty by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes which can all be calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) :
where y i is a welfare indicator (consumption expenditure per capita in this paper) for person i, z is the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the number of poor people, and α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion.
When α = 0, we have the headcount index H which measures the proportion of people below the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we have the poverty gap PG which measures the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap P 2 which measures the severity of poverty, respectively.
Impact of the program on poverty of the participants is given by:
where the first term in the left-hand side of (11) is the measure of poverty in the presence of the VBSP program. This term is observed and can be estimated directly from the sample data. However, the second term in the left-hand side of (11) is the counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., poverty indexes of the credit recipients if they had not received the credit. This term is not observed directly, and it is estimated using predicted expenditure in the absence of the microcredit program. Since the method of instrumental variables produces statistically significant results, it is used to estimate counterfactual expenditure. Recall the outcome equation is as follows:
β αX
However, we do not use this counterfactual expenditure to estimate the poverty indices directly. Using the counterfactual expenditure to estimate poverty for each households, and then adding up will lead to biased estimators of poverty indices (Hentschel, et al., 2000) . Instead, we employ an idea from "small area estimation" by Elbers, et al. (2003) . Firstly, we estimate equation (4.3) using the instrumental variables regression. Then, for household i, denote P i as the indicator of poverty for the household. P i is equal to 1 if per capita expenditure of the household is below the poverty line, and equal to 0, otherwise. The estimator to predict the expected poverty of household i if they had not borrowed credit is as follows:
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal function; α and β are estimators of α and β , respectively; σ is estimator of the standard deviation of error term ε in the outcome equation, 0 i Ŷ is predicted expenditure per capita of household i in the absence of the VBSP credit.
Poverty rate for the group of the participants is simply the sum of expected poverty of the participants. Thus the estimator of the headcount index is simply as follows:
where m i is the size of household i; M is the total population of the participating group; and N is the number of households in the participating group.
To estimate the poverty gap index PG, and the poverty severity index P 2 , we employ a method proposed by Minot, et al. (2003) to estimate the cumulative distribution of the expenditure per capita in the absence of the VBSP credit by changing the poverty line from the lowest expenditure per capita to the highest expenditure per capita in the sample. The estimated cumulative distribution is then used to estimate the poverty indexes PG and P 2 (in the state of nocredit from the program). To estimate standard error of estimates, the paper uses a nonparametric bootstrap technique with 200 replications. Table 8 presents estimation of the VBSP impact on poverty of the participants. The IV regressions are used to predict the expenditure per capita without the program, and the program variable is the size of loans. IV estimators include 2SLS, GMM, and LIML. The three estimators yield rather similar results of estimation of the program impact on poverty. For example, based on the 2SLS estimator, the impact on reduction in poverty rate is estimated at 11.4% with the significance level of 1%. In other words, the VBSP program helps the participants reduce the poverty rate by 11.4 percentage points. The program also reduces the poverty gap index of the participants by 0.078 with the statistical significance level of 5%. The poverty severity index is also reduced by 0.046 due to the credit from the program. The statistical significance level of this estimate is 10%.
Conclusions
The paper examines the poverty targeting and impact of the preferential credit program for the poor from VBSP. The program is designed to provide the poor households with credit at low interest rates without collateral. However, the program is targeted poorly at the poor. Only 12% of the poor households in rural areas participated in the program in 2004. Meanwhile, the program covered 6.4% of the non-poor households. Since the non-poor households accounted for a larger proportion of population, up to 67.1% of the participants were found as non-poor households. The poor households also received smaller amounts of credit than the non-poor. In terms of targeting, the program is not very pro-poor. Although, the poor access the program more proportionally than the non-poor, they account for a smaller proportion of the program participants. One of main reasons for the poor targeting can be explained in Dufhues, et al. (2002) . Heads of credit groups and communes are reluctant to verify the poor households in the list of credit applicants because of their low capacity of repayment. Clearly, lending the non-poor or even rich households is less risky in terms of repayment. Thus the Government and VBSP need to have measures to modify the lending system so that the leakage rate of the program can be reduced, and the coverage rate can be increased. Further studies on the lending system and the selection process should be conducted to have more detailed suggestions for the modification.
Empirical results from impact evaluation show that the program has positive and statistically significant impact on consumption expenditure per capita and income per capita of the participating households. Since the program has positive impact on households' expenditure, it is expected that the program can contribute to poverty reduction. It is found that the program has positive and statistically significant effect on reduction of the poverty rate, poverty gap and poverty severity. The findings suggest that the Government can expand the program to cover a larger proportion of the poor households taking into account the reduction of leakage rate. 
Appendix: Tables on IV regression and fixed-effect with IV regression
